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Is the Citizen Suit a Substitute for the
Class Action in Environmental Litigation?
An Examination of the Clean Air Act
Of 1970 Citizen Suit Provision
GABRIEL N. STEINBERG*
PRESENT STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CLASS AcTioN
In an editorial reprinted in the Chicago Sun-Times, from the Ari-
zona Daily Star, the death knell for the environmental lawsuit was
rung.
The ruling on class-action lawsuits, by the U.S. Supreme Court,
strikes a damaging blow to the millions of anonymous, often pow-
erless individuals for whom the class-action suit has become the
only effective recourse against systematic inequities.
Ruling on the case of a New York shoe merchant who had sued
in behalf of small investors against high brokerage fees for odd lot
* B.A. University of Michigan, 1968; J.D. University of Chicago, 1971.
Associate, Overton, Schwartz & Yacker Ltd., Chicago, Ill. The author for-
merly was an attorney in the Enforcement Division, Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, Region V, Chicago, Illinois.
The views expressed herein are those of the author. They do not repre-
sent the views of EPA or any other agency. This article was written by
Gabriel N. Steinberg in his private capacity. No official support or en-
dorsement by the EPA or any other agency is intended or should be in-
ferred.
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stock buyers, the high court declared that plaintiffs in class actions
must individually notify all members of the class they represent
"whose names and addresses may be ascertained by reasonable ef-
fort."
It requires very little extrapolation to determine that this spells
death for such environmental and health lawsuits as those filed
against major polluters, in behalf of a city, county or state popula-
tion whose lives may be threatened by fouled air and water. Con-
sumer interests and legal-aid assistance to the poor and minorities
also have been dealt crippling setbacks.
The class action was born out of the simple fact that a lone in-
dividual, injured by a polluter, or by an overcharging business, by
a dishonest used car dealer, or an unfair landlord, might not have
a serious enough complaint to warrant jury trial, or might lack the
resources to press his suit. Collectively, plaintiffs who could dem-
onstrate that they were among other people thus injured-whether
the remainder of that "class" chose to join the suit, or even knew
of it-could command the attention of the court.
Now, high cost has again put justice out of the reach of those
most in need of it.1
The editorial, while compelling and forceful but intended for the
layman, does not express the viewpoint of this attorney. Eisen v.
Carlisle and Jacquelin does not spell death for the environmental
lawsuit. Along with Zahn v. International Paper,3 however, Eisen
will demand that the environmental lawyer thoroughly analyze his
case for procedural difficulties before commencing suit. An adage
expressed by Judge Decker in another class action case is very ap-
propriate. "A lawsuit is a fruit tree planted in a lawyer's gar-
den."4
One can carry the metaphorical image of a garden further and
-find, as Professor Arthur John Keeffe has, that the class action
has become "ungreened" and that "a single weed spoils the garden."0
Zahn stands for the rule that if there is a possibility that one plain-
tiff has less than $10,000 in damages, the whole class must be dis-
missed. In other words, in class actions founded upon diversity
1. Editorial, Justice out of Reach, Chicago Sun-Times, June 15, 1974, at
27, reprinted from Arizona Daily Star.
2. Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2149 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Eisen].
3. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Zahn].
4. Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1316 (D.D.C. 1973), quoted from
Judge Decker in Illinois v. Harper and Row Publishers, 55 F.R.D. 221, 224
(N.D. Ill. 1972). Judge Richey said that the purpose of suit was to restore
the rights of a deprived class and in such circumstances a sizeable diversion
of the recovery for attorneys' fees would merely constitute a substitution
of one fiduciary with another.
5. Keeffe and Lash, The Ungreening of the Class Action, 60 A.B.A.J. 739
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Keeffe].
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jurisdiction every member of the plaintiff class must meet the
$10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement. The Eisen case holds
that a class action suit requires individual notice to all class mem-
bers who can be identified through reasonable effort with the cost
of notification borne by the plaintiff.
The Zahn and Eisen decisions were not unexpected blows to the
class action under Rule 23(b) (3).6 During the 1960's and early
1970's both the substantive field of environmental law and the pro-
cedural one of the class action were expanding rapidly, but such
advances could not be allowed to continue indefinitely.7 There
have been several environmental class action cases that have been
quickly dismissed because the procedural niceties were not or could
not be observed, and the environmental control demanded was too
great.8 For example, a case brought by the Heart Disease Research
Foundation and two individual plaintiffs sought $375 trillion in air
pollution damages from the major American car manufacturers on
behalf of the residents in the metropolitan areas of the United
States. In not placing practical limits on the size of the class and
the claim, the plaintiffs earned a rebuke from the court:
It would be interesting to ruminate upon all the ironies and absur-
dities, intended or unintended, of this amended pleading ....
Plaintiffs and their counsel have failed to realize that the damages
sought are some 300 times more than the annual gross national
product of the United States.9
The negative reaction to both the environmental and class action
lawsuit has been building. The kindness to environmental lawsuits
that has been exhibited by many courts is giving way increasingly
to the proposition that these suits must meet the procedural de-
mands require of other lawsuits. The effort of environmental
lawyers to turn every suit into a class action19 will be as sef-de-
6. The Supreme Court Restricts the Class Action: Zahn v. International
Paper, 4 ENv. REP. 10034 (1974).
7. The Eisen and Zahn Supreme Court cases, the energy crisis, and sev-
eral other court cases on federal environmental litigation (e.g., the Alaska
pipeline) have combined to check the progress made in developing cause
of action in the environmental field.
8. Comment, The Viability of Class Actions in Environmental Litigation,
2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 536-37 (1972).
9. Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d
98 (2nd Cir. 1972) [quote appears in full text of the opinion cited in 3
ERC 1710, 1711 (1972) ].
10. Comment, The Federal Class Action in Environment Litigation: Prob-
feating as challenging every administrative action affecting the en-
vironment as "arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable."' 1  Either
type of action would exhibit a miscomprehension of pollution, legal
procedure, and the economic costs of pollution abatement.
The Zahn case did not exhibit plaintiffs blatantly demanding too
much from the courts or disobeying the procedural niceties then
existing, but it is illustrative of the recent judicial checking of en-
vironmental and procedural advances. The case may mean that
the mass tort action at the federal level has become unavailable.
By upholding the decision of the Second Circuit, Justice White's
opinion apparently agreed with the following:
Once appellee's liability had been established, and even assuming
that appellee's defenses would not vary as to different members of
appellants' class, it would be an enormously time consuming task
to assess the damages suffered by each of the 200 riparian land-
owners, each of whose claims is regarded as separate and distinct.
Indeed, the Advisory Committee did not intend that Rule 23(b) (3)
ordinarily be utilized in a mass tort situation. Moreover a second
policy consideration relied upon in Snyder is relevant here: local
controversies involving claims to be settled on the basis of statelaw "can often be most appropriately tried in state courts."12
Justice White held:
We conclude . . .that the Court of Appeals . . . accurately read
and applied Snyder v. Harris. Each plaintiff in a Rule 23 (b) (3)
class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff
who does not must be dismissed from the case-one plaintiff may
not ride in on another's coattails.13
The majority opinion, basing its decision on Synder v. Harris,14
quoted from that case in stating:
The doctrine that separate and distinct claims could not be aggre-
gated was never, and is not now, based upon the categories of old
Rule 23 or of any rule of procedure.
. . . Nothing in the amended Rule 23 changes this doctrine.... The
fact that judgments under class actions formerly classified as spur-
ious may now have the same effect as claims brought under thejoinder provisions is certainly no reason to treat them differently
from joined actions for purposes of aggregation.
It is interesting from the environmental standpoint to note that
lems and Possibilities, 51 N.C. L. REv. 1358 (1973).
11. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness
of Administrative Law, 70 CoLum. L. Rzv. 612 (1970). The author of this
article has seen many briefs challenging the actions of the EPA Administra-
tor. The challenged actions are almost always "arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable"; it is a litany for the administrative lawyer. See, e.g., Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
12. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1036 (2nd Cir. 1972).
13. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301.
14. 394 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1969).
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the Supreme Court in Zahn specifically included and therefore
seemingly limited a case considered to be an environmental victory.
Justice White stated in Footnote 11 of the Zahn case:
Because a class action invoking general federal-question juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 would be subject to the same juris-
dictional amount rules with respect to plaintiffs having separate
and distinct claims, the result here would be the same even if a
cause of action under federal law could be stated, see Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-101 (1972), or if substantive fed-
eral law were held to control this case .... 15
Thus, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 6 in which the Supreme Court
held that there is a right to sue in United States District Court
to abate pollution of interstate or navigable waters under a fed-
eral common law nuisance theory, was severely limited.
At oral argument Justices Brennan and White asked counsel
whether the suit was not subject to federal common law (Justice
Brandeis notwithstanding) under Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972). Lest we surmise that Zahn is but a figment of
the court's antipathy for diversity cases, Justice White, writing for
the majority, slips in a final footnote to remind us that federal
claims, not exempted by statute, are also subject to the $10,000 re-
quirement and thus to the Zahn rule.17
Justice Brennan, in his well-reasoned dissent, did not directly re-
ply to Justice White, but both Justices were, I am sure, aware of
cases that had extended the right to abate pollution under the doc-
trine of federal common law nuisance. For example, in United
States v. U.S. Steel Corporation,'5 the Northern District Court of
Illinois found that non-governmental parties could sue under fed-
eral common law nuisance, that the federal government could sue
under federal common law, and that this action could be brought
despite the existence of comprehensive water pollution control leg-
islation at the federal level.19 In another case referring to Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, a Vermont District Court noted that the gen-
eral public has substantial rights to the use and enjoyment of water
not -polluted, and this right not only belongs to those who live in
15. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 302.
16. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
17. Keefe, supra note 5, at 739.
18. 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
19. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), and, as amended
1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (1970) and 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp.
H11972).
the state where the body of water is located but extends also to
out-of-state guests and visitors-and if unreasonably interfered
with constitutes a public nuisance.20
While the Zahn decision has interfered with the possibility of
private actions under federal common law,21 the Eisen case has evi-
dently interfered with the right of the consumer, the little guy,
to take on the large corporation. According to several observers,
because of Eisen, "it has become easier to cheat a million people
out of a dollar each than to cheat one person out of $1-million." 22
It is felt that the Eisen case will have its most significant impact
on consumer suits and on those dealing with corporate liability and
violation of federal securities law. While we note that environ-
mental disclosure is now required under Securities and Exchange
Commission regulations, 23 environmental class actions have not had
the notice problems the consumer and stockholder derivative ac-
tions have had. This may be because environmental costs are
passed on indirectly to the citizen rather than directly (e.g., where
the citizen pays the defendant directly for his service or product).
It appears that pollution class action suits have met the notice re-
quirement of 23(c) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "the
best notice practicable under the circumstances, . . ." or have met
the limited notice requirements for injunctive class action suits un-
der 23 (c) (3).
In commenting on the Eisen case, "Rod Cameron, the Executive
Director of the Environmental Defense Fund, said, 'generally, it will
not have much of an effect,' on the group's legal activities, since
it is 'almost always' seeking injunctive relief rather than damages.
'We don't see it as a major impingement on what we do,' he said. '24
Others have also commented on the trend in environmental litiga-
tion towards seeking injunctive relief. "Environmental litigation
in the past few years has concentrated on enjoinging harmful activi-
ties or compelling beneficial acts before the damage has taken place;
20. United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt.
1972).
21. See, Comment, Environmental Law-Water Pollution Remedies-Use
of Public Nuisance Theory in Suit by Federal and State Governments-
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 15 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rsv. 795,
808-09 (1974).
22. Raymond Brown, Laywer, Public Citizens Litigation Group, quoted
in an article by Charlton, Impact of Ruling by Court Studied: Lawyers
See Strong Effect on Class-Action Suits by Consumer Groups, N.Y. Times,
May 30, 1974, at 55, col. 3.
23. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5386 (April 20, 1973), reprinted in
CCH FED. Sc. L. REP., 79,342.
24. Quoted in an article by Charlton, supra note 22.
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ensuring that adequate compensation is paid after the fact is at
best a secondary goal."25
A case prior to Zahn that illustrates the tailored notice to satisfy
the courts in seeking relief in the form of a class action is Biechele
v. Norfolk and W.R. Co. 28 This action by city residents in the area
of a railroad company's coal storage facilities was held properly
maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b). The court said
that common questions of fact predominated. In ascertaining the
geographical boundaries of the class, the court accepted evidence
as to the extent and duration of the alleged injuries, together with
a knowledge of the prevailing winds. The action, which had been
removed to the Federal District Court on the ground of diversity
of citizenship involved not only a claim for damages, but also a
claim for injunctive relief. Thus, Rules 23(b) (1)-(3) were involved.
The court granted the relief sought and discussed its procedure of
notice by publication in the Sandusky Register. The author, who
has viewed notice as a mere formality, finds this case interesting
in that 731 residents joined the damage action, 532 filed declinations
to participate, and several thousand took no action. With regard
to the effect of Zahn on a case like this, the court in assuming
jurisdiction over the entire controversy in the interest of judicial
efficiency because it had jurisdiction of the injunctive action,
pointed out that the damage claims of the individual members of
the class could not be aggregated to achieve the jurisdictional
amount.
The successful outcome of Biechele is an example of what some
observers thought would become a commonplace occurrence in en-
vironmental litigation-namely, the successful use of the class ac-
tion format. In an often-cited article, Robert Lohrmann discussed
the rationale for the class action in environmental litigation as fol-
lows:
The class action is a procedural device used by the courts to ef-
fect a remedy for the plaintiff who has a small stake in a large
controversy. Given the widespread effect of most incidents of pol-
lution, the class action, born out of equity where joinder was im-
practicable, would seem an ideal method of seeking redress in en-
vironmental litigation. 27
25. The Supreme Court Restricts the Class Action, supra note 6, at 10035.
26. 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969); see generally Annot., Pollution
of Environment Class Action, 7 A.L.R. Fed. 907-10.
27. Lohrmann, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and
113-
Lohrmann continues on in his discussion of the desirability of
class actions in the environmental field and cites a widely quoted
passage from an article on the economics of class actions to justify
his point:28 "... the most suitable controversies for resolution in
a class action are those that arise as a result of: (1) violation of
a standard of conduct by a single defendant, which (2) causes the
same type of harm to many individuals, where (3) the few defenses
raised are common to all the separate bilateral relationships.12D
Lohrmann concludes his passage: "Thus, pollution traceable to the
activities of a single industrial firm and affecting a substantial
number of neighboring individuals would certainly appear to be
an apt subject for class litigation."30
Two recent state court actions in the Chicago area illustrate the
attraction of the class action format. A suit seeking $2.6 million
in damages was filed on 'behalf of Hammond and Whiting residents
whose homes allegedly were damaged when Standard Oil's huge
storage tanks in that area were chemically cleaned.31 In another
tank storage case, three suits seeking more than $125 million for
health and property damage were filed against Bulk Terminals for
a silicon tetrachloride leak on Chicago's southside in April 1974.82
The immense sums involved in these two cases exemplify another
litigational advantage of the class action that is pointed out by
Lohrmann.
Furthermore, the class action would allow the potentially prohibi-
tive costs of this type of suit, e.g., obtaining counsel of sufficient
Evolving Theories to Control Pollution, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1085 (1970), re-
printed in H.F. Sherrod, ed., 2 ENVIRONMENT L. REV. 199, 213 (1971).
28. See Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 383 (1969).
29. Id. at 411.
30. Lohrmann, supra note 27, at 213.
31. OK Class Action against Oil Firm, Chicago Sun-Times, June 7, 1974,
at 17, cols. 1-3. This action was brought under Indiana law and was dis-
cussed by the author with the plaintiffs' attorney Alan R. Smulevitz, tele-
phone conversation, June 25, 1974.
32. Chemical Firm Fined in Gas Leak, Chicago Daily News, July 19, 1974,
at 5. The City of Chicago filed a $5.5 million damage suit against the Bulk
Terminals Co., the owners of a chemical tank which leaked large quantities
of silicon tetrachloride into the air over the city in April 1974. The suit
which was filed as a class action on behalf of all residents of the city
charged the firm with the creation of an immediate and irreparable danger
to the health of the people of Chicago, as well as to plant, animal life, and
personal property in the city. Bulk Terminals was also charged with main-
tenance of a common law nuisance. The city's suit also asked for $450,000
in costs incurred by the city in attempting to stop the leak. In a settlement
agreed to between the city and the company, the city collected a $31,000
fine and the company agreed not to store the chemical in the city. This
action was discussed by the author with Assistant Corporation Counsel for
the City of Chicago, Barry Greenburg, conversations May-July 1974.
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caliber to match that of the offending industry, providing expert
witness fees, financing the necessary technical and legal research,
etc., to be shared among members of the class. Additionally, where
the remedy sought includes damages, the potential recovery for the
aggregate claims may attract attorneys otherwise reluctant to rep-
resent a single claimant.33
However desirable the class action appears theoretically, the fact
remains that at the present time Zahn and Eisen have limited the
usefulness of this procedural device. The fact situation of Zahn
was, theoretically, the ideal controversy to be settled by a class ac-
tion.34 The lawsuit arose as a result of (1) violation of a standard
of conduct by a single paper mill, which (2) discharged into Lake
Champlain causing damage to the numerous property owners and
other people surrounding the lake, where (3) the defendant's course
of conduct would be the same for the bilateral relationships. The
Supreme Court, however, still felt that the potential for abuse of
the class action was too great, and every plaintiff must show the
requisite $10,000 or more amount of injury or be dismissed from
the lawsuit. While the Court may have feared the overcrowding
of courtrooms with class action litigation, the Zahn decision may
actually have the opposite result by causing inefficient judicial ad-
ministration of similar claims. As Justice Brennan pointed out in
his dissent:
And the practical reasons for permitting adjudication of the claims
of the entire class are certainly as strong as those supporting ancil-
lary jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims and parties that
are entitled to intervene as of right. Class actions were born of
necessity. The alternatives were joinder of the entire class or re-
dundant litigation of the common issues. The cost to the litigants
and the drain on the resources of the judiciary resulting from either
alternative would have been intolerable. And this case presents
precisely those difficulties: approximately 240 claimants are in-
volved, and the issues will doubtless call for extensive use of expert
testimony on difficult scientific issues.3 5
With the Zahn decision, the enthusiasm for the class action as
"the most important device for the declaration of environmental
rights"30 must be rethought. In agreeing with Justice Brennan's
dissent, one commentator noted:
33. Lohrmann, supra note 27, at 213.
34. See text accompanying notes 28-30, supra.
35. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 307.
36. V. YANACONE & B. CoHEN, 1 ENvmonvE=TAL RxGRTs AND REMDIES,
§ 6:10, at 363 (1972).
Today, there is an increasing public concern over the quality of our
urban and natural environment. Plaintiffs have sought to use the
class action as a means for the expeditious resolution of the nu-
merous claims resulting from environmental pollution.... As a
result of the majority opinion in Zahn, companies such as Inter-
tional Paper can successfully limit their liability only to named
plaintiffs that can show the requisite jurisdictional amount for suit
in the federal courts.
The fear of opening the "floodgates" to class action litigation...
gives little credit to the ability of the judiciary to determine what
prospective class actions are properly or improperly brought. Not
only will the effect of Zahn v. International Paper Company be
to render impotent the class action procedure in environmental
suits, but it will also retard the development of more efficient and
economical procedures for judicial administration.87
A similar viewpoint to that expressed above concerning Zahn
was taken in Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Eisen:
I agree with Chafee that a class action serves not only the con-
venience of the parties but also prompt, efficient judicial adminis-
tration. I think in our society that is growing in complexity there
are bound to be innumerable people in common disasters, calami-
ties or ventures who would be begging for justice without the class
action but who could with all regard to due process be protected.38
In describing these people who could benefit from the class action,
Justice Douglas, his love of the outdoors showing,8 9 specifically
mentioned the environmentalists. "Some may be environmentalists
who have no photographic development plant about to be ruined
because of air pollution by radiation but who suffer perceptibly
by smoke, noxious gases, or radiation. '40 Finally, in his dissent,
Justice Douglas quoted Judge Weinstein, who said, "When the or-
ganization of a modern society, such as ours, affords the possibility
of illegal behavior accompanied by widespread, diffuse conse-
quences, some procedural means must exist to remedy-or at least
to deter-that conduct."41
After the opinions above concerning the difficulties that class ac-
tion suits now face, what recourse is left for the environmental
attorney? The initial instinct of the attorney would be to stick
with the class action; perhaps not Rule 23 (b) (3) actions but actions
37. Snow, RECENT DECISIONS: FEDERAL COURTS: Multiple Plain-
tiffs with Separate and Distinct Claims Must Each Satisfy the Jurisdictional
Amount for Class Action Suits in Federal Courts. Zahn v. International
Paper Company, 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973), 62 ILL. B. J. 516, 518 (1974).
38. Eisen, 94 S. Ct. at 2156.
39. Justice Douglas is the author of several books on the outdoors, includ-
ing MAw Am MOUNTAIN (19-).
40. Eisen, 94 S. Ct. at 2156.
41. Id., quoted from Judge Weinstein writing in the New York Law Jour-
nal, at 4, May 2, 1972.
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for injunctive relief under 23 (b) (2) or (b) (1). The argument
would be that a federal court may choose to assume jurisdiction
over an equitable claim considered true and then exercise its ancil-
lary jurisdiction to hear an action for damages arising out of the
same facts. The use of ancilliary jurisdiction is a discretionary de-
vice if the litigation of the issues becomes burdensome.42 However,
once the court secures jurisdiction over the injunctive action, it can
exercise its ancillary jurisdiction and determine membership in the
class and assess damages. 43 This is simply an argument for the
extension of ancillary jurisdiction and it is not clear that the courts
would do this very often since it is clearly discretionary.
CITIZEN SUITS
A more certain means of securing access to federal courts and
accomplishing some pollution abatement may be the recently en-
acted citizen suit statutes in the relatively new federal environ-
mental legislation.44  It is the primary purpose of this article to
present the citizen suit provision as a method for environmental
litigation that should become increasingly useful to the environ-
mental lawyer. The relatively few significant cases under these
provisions indicate an insufficient utilization of an important new
procedural method for obtaining environmental relief.
Before discussing the relevant provisions, we should define and
explain the meaning of "citizen suit" for our purposes. We are dis-
cussing essentially the citizen suit provisions in the Clean Air Act
of 1970,45 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972,46 and
the Noise Control Act of 1972.47 There are other environmental
acts, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 48 and
42. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
43. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§ 1784 (1972); also see generally Snow, supra note 37, and Lohrmann, su-
pra note 27, at 218.
44. See Clean Air Act of 1970, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq., Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., and Noise
Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4901 et seq.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970). Since this section will be referred to
throughout this paper, the author has attached as Appendix A a copy of
this section, and the author shall hereinafter call this citizen suit provision,
section 304, as in the statutes at large.
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1972).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1972).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). The most heavily litigated provision in
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,49 which allow some form of
private action-whether challenging administrative agencies or re-
ceiving a bounty 50 for gathering evidence. These actions, however,
are by and large for or against the government. At the federal
level, the procedure for suing a polluter as a private citizen at the
present time remains through the specific pollution control acts.
This article will concentrate on the Clean Air Act of 1970 because
it was an archetype for the environmental control legislation that
came afterwards;51 other legislation, and cases, though, will be
mentioned.
These federal citizen suit provisions arose, however, as a limited
response to the demand for the creation of a broad private right
to sue for purposes of environmental protection. 2  Some observers
felt that trees and rocks, like ships, should be able to sue in their
own name,53 and others have felt that the Constitution created a
right to live in a decent, healthful environment.54 Professor Sax
of the University of Michigan based his right to private action on
the public trust doctrine.5 5 This doctrine suggests that government
has a high fiduciary duty of care and responsibility to the general
public much like a trustee to the beneficiary. The state as trustee
for the public cannot, by acquiescence, abandon the trust property
or enable a diversion of it to private ends different from the object
for which the trust was created.56 The Professor noted the differ-
ence between the public trust doctrine and a constitutional right
to a decent environment. "A right with constitutional status does
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has been section 102 (2) (c)
setting forth the basic requirements for impact statements.
49. 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407, 411, (popularly known as the "Refuse Act").
50. Informants under the 1899 Refuse Act (33 U.S.C. § 411) may be en-
titled to a portion of the collected fine. The Fourth Circuit has held that
the statute requires an award of one-half the fine to the informant. Miller
v. United States, 455 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1971).
51. Two books that discussed and criticized the federal air pollution pro-
gram and suggested changes prior to the Clean Air Act of 1970 are: J. DA-
viEs, THE PoITIcs OF POLLUTION (1970), and J. Esposrro, VANIsHING Am
(1970), (also known as the Nadar Study Report on Air Pollution).
52. J. SAx, DEFENmING TnE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CmIzEN Ac-
TION (1970). [Hereinafter SAx].
53. See, e.g., Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974).
54. See, e.g., Tanner v. Anco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex.
1972), discussion at notes 180-84, infra.
55. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 Mca. L. REv. 473, 485-88 (1970). [Hereinafter
Sax, MIcH. L. REV.]. See also Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust
Doctrine and the Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 388, for constitutional
argument.
56. Sax, supra note 55, at 485-88.
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indeed create the opportunity for its enforcement in the courts, but
it also-and herein lies the danger-gives the courts ultimate au-
thority. '' 57 Sax feels that ultimate decision-making power should
be left in the hands of the people through their elected representa-
tives.58 H. Floyd Sherrod, Jr., the editor of Environment Law Re-
view, commented in 1971 on the distinction between a legislative
cause of action and a constitutional one as follows:
It is instructive to compare the difficulties of controlling air pol-
lution by assertion of a constitutional right with the citizens' suit
provision of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. Under those
amendments the policy-balancing activities would have already
been generally determined by the legislature, and pursuant to the
established policies administrative agencies (with public partici-
pation) will have set the standards. However, citizens can see that
these standards are enforced by the courts. Generally, the only is-
sue in such suits would be whether or not a particular alleged pol-
luter has violated a specific pre-established standard. Thus citizens
and their organizations will have an opportunity to be of real as-
sistance in the enforcement process, and through the courts can
assure that agencies do their job of carrying out the legislative
will. The court then has a manageable issue with which to work. 59
Mr. Sherrod's idealistic vision of the citizen suit provision has
unfortunately (or maybe fortunately for lawyers) not come about.
This concept of the citizen suit, arising from Professor Sax's resur-
rection of the public trust doctrine has proved difficult for lawyers
and judges to grasp. It is not a panacea for air pollution, but
neither is it limited to taking action only against the Administrator
of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
The citizen suit can be an effective tool for a better environment
and enlarge the arsenal of the environmental lawyer which has be-
come diminished through the limitations placed on the class action.
"If lawyers and their clients are willing to ask for less than the
impossible, the judiciary can be expected to play an increasingly
important and fruitful role in safeguarding the public trust."60 Put
'another way, the citizen suit provisions derived from the public
trust doctrine offer the environmental lawyer means of nurturing
that fruit tree into a worthwhile, viable lawsuit.
57. SAx, supra note 52, at 237-38.
58. This is why the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (Public Law
127) is not a blanket invitation to sue but applies standards before a citizen
can obtain relief. Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MCLA
Sec. 691.1202, MSA 14.529 (202).
59. Sherrod, Introductory Survey, 2 EvmroNwmNT L. REv. xvii (1971).
60. Sax, supra note 55, at 566.
To use these provisions reasonably requires an understanding of
the statutory basis. While the Clean Air Act has correctly been
called lengthy and complicated, 61 we will explain its essential provi-
sions before commencing our discussion of the limitations and uses
of section 30462 of the Act. The Clean Air Act was designed as
a comprehensive piece of federal legislation to place primary re-
sponsibility for control of air pollution on the states and ultimate
responsibility on the federal government. 63 To implement this con-
trol of air pollution, a strict timetable was detailed in the Act to
attain healthful air quality across the nation by mid-1975 or at the
latest by mid-1977. If the states defaulted on plan development
in implementing the timetable, then the federal government would
promulgate its own regulations.
The Administrator of the U.S. EPA on April 30, 1971, published
in the Federal Register national ambient air quality standards: pri-
mary standards to protect the public health and secondary stand-
ards to assure the public welfare. 64 Within nine months thereafter,
or by January 31, 1972, to achieve these clean-air objectives, each
state was required to adopt and submit to EPA for approval, an
implementation plan which contained procedures and regulations
for reducing emissions from sources of air pollution within the
state; the plan was to be designed to achieve the national ambient
air quality standards within established time limits.
To assist the states in the preparation of these implementation
plans, the Administrator promulgated on August 14, 1971, regula-
tions setting forth requirements for the preparation, adoption, and
submittal of state implementation plans.6 5 Four months after the
state submitted their plans to EPA, on May 31, 1972, the Adminis-
trator approved, with specified exceptions, those plans.60 The
Clean Air Act provides that EPA approval of a state's implementa-
tion plan makes the requirements of that plan enforceable by the
federal government as well as by the state. The Administrator ap-
61. West Penn. Power v. Train, - F. Supp. - (W.D. Penn. 1974), 6 ERC
1722.
62. See note 45, supra.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970). See e.g., Trumbull, Federal Control of Sta-
tionary Source Air Pollution, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 283 (1972), and Steinberg, The
Federal Clean Air Act Structure and Program, remarks before Environmen-
tal Engineering Seminar, Northwestern University, speech available at
Technological Institute from Professor James Quon.
64. 36 Fed. Reg. 8187 (1971), 40 C.F.R. Part 50.
65. 36 Fed. Reg. 15486 (1971), 40 C.F.R. Part 51.
66. 37 Fed. Reg. 10842 (1972), 40 C.F.R. Part. 52. Amendments have
been promulgated from time-to-time for all parts of the regulations imple-
menting the Clean Air Act.
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proved those plans that met the standards set forth in section 110
(a) (2) of the Act.67 Besides the attainment dates for the air qual-
ity standards, each state implementation plan was required to have
most important emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for
compliance with such limitations to attain and maintain the air
quality standards, including, if necessary land-use and transporta-
tion controls.68
Essential to pollution control under the Clean Air Act are these
emission limitations. It is through these emission control regula-
tions that the amount of pollutant going into the ambient air is
reduced. Emission control is commonly in terms of opacity of
smoke, pounds of pollutant emitted per ton of process weight or
per million BTU of heat input of fuel, and by sulfur or ash content
of the fuel.69 Whether these regulations are adopted by the state
and approved -by EPA, or if EPA promulgates regulations for a
state where that state has failed to act, these regulations -be-
come federal law enforceable by the states, EPA, and private citi-
zens.
Federal enforcement of implementation plans is carried out under
section 113 of the Clean Air Act.70 Section 113 (a) (1) provides for
a notice of violation to any person in violation of the applicable
implementation plan. If the violation continues past 30 days after
the Administrator's notification, then the Administrator may issue
an order, after giving the pollution source an opportunity to confer,
requiring compliance, or EPA may commence a civil action for
appropriate relief. In addition, section 113(c) sets forth certain
criminal penalties that are available if such violation is a knowing
violation of a plan requirement or EPA order.
The citizen suit provision, section 304, is a supplemental enforce-
ment tool for it allows any person to commence a civil action to
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (1970).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (B) (1970).
69. See, e.g., 36 Fed. Reg. 22406-408 (1971). Two local ordinances that
this author has had occasion to examine include the Los Angeles County
Air Pollution Ordinance and the Wayne County, Michigan Air Pollution
Control Ordinance. For a good explanation of air pollution control regula-
tions, this author suggests Opinion of the Illinois Pollution Control Board
(by Chairman David Currie), In the matter of Emission Standards, PCB
R71-23 (April 13, 1972).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970).
enforce the requirements of a federally approved or promulgated
plan after giving the EPA, the state in which the violation occurs,
and the source of the violation (the polluter) sixty days notice, and
allows for suits against the Administrator when he fails to perform
an act that is not discretionary under the Act.71 "The term 'person'
includes an individual corporation, partnership, association, State,
municipality, and political subdivision of a State. '7 2
Besides section 304, the other major provision allowing for judi-
cial intervention in EPA administration of the Clean Air Act is sec-
tion 307(b). 73 It allows for judicial review of various actions of
the Administrator as he carries out the 1970 Amendments. It pre-
scribes the U.S. Courts of Appeals as where the petitions for review
must be filed. Petitions to review promulgation or approval of an
implementation plan may be filed only in the U.S. court of appeals
covering the state plan being challenged. Petitions must be filed
within 30 days from the date of EPA approval or promulgation.
Actions of the Administrator that are reviewable only in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia include: ". . . action
of the Administrator in promulgating any national primary or sec-
ondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard under
[the hazardous emission section], any standard of performance un-
der [the new source performance standards section], . . .,74 and
any standard or control measure under Title II of the Act, which
allows for establishment of emission standards and controls for mo-
bile sources of air pollution, e.g., auto emission standards75 and un-
leaded gasoline regulations.7 6
On the surface, the practical distinction between sections 304 and
307 appears clear; however, courts and lawyers have had difficulties
distinguishing which suits should be brought under what sections
to obtain judicial review of EPA actions. "The courts have indi-
cated that the dividing line between suits that fall under section
304 and those falling under 307 often is a narrow one. That divid-
ing line is important because the sections specify different forums
for review, and filing under the wrong sections will mean dismissal
71. See Appendix A infra.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-(e) (1970).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1970). See generally Luneburg and Ro-
selle, Judicial Review under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 15 B.C. IND.
& Com. L. Rrv. 667 (1974).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1) (1970).
75. See, e.g., International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
76. See, e.g., AMOCO Oil v. EPA, - F. Supp. - (D.C. Cir. 1974), 6 ERC
1481.
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of the suit."77 This author suggests that the courts are moving
towards using section 304 in enforcement related matters while
looking towards section 307 when the Agency has improperly car-
ried out its ministerial rather than prosecutorial duties under the
Act.78
To use section 304 for enforcement purposes requires an under-
standing of recent cases illuminating the provision through which an
understanding of the problems, limitations, and possibilities of the
provision can hopefully be gained. Although the section provides
for suits against the Administrator, the EPA has facilitated an un-
derstanding of this provision through reprinting of a Natural Re-
sources Defense Council article Citizen Suits under the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970.79 This pamphlet explains in detail the
statutory provision, but the cases were not yet available for a read-
ing of how the statute would operate in practice. This portion of
the article shall attempt to show how the provision has been work-
ing in practice and whether it holds out any real hope for becoming
as an important a tool for environmental litigation as the class ac-
tion.
The first question is who has standing under the section. Any
"person," as defined above, has the right to sue any other person
to enjoin violations of the Act. At first glance, it appears from
the use of the term "any person" that standing is not a problem
under this section. This is not wholly true for the courts have been
using the standing test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sierra
Club v. Morton.80 In Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Colum-
bia,"' an action brought under the Clean Air Act to enforce an emis-
77. Bolbach, The Courts and the Clean Air Act, Monograph No. 19, 5 En-
vironment Reporter 6 (1974).
78. Luneburg and Roselle, supra note 73, at 691: "Actions pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (a) (2) (1970) are, in a sense, proceedings for enforcement,
and therefore 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (b) (2) (1970), by its express terms, ap-
plies thereto to prevent the raising of issues which could have been raised
earlier."
79. Ayres and Miller, Citizen Suits under the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970, 1 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Newsletter, Issue 4
(1972), reprinted by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pub-
lic Affairs, Washington, D.C., EPA-335 (hereinafter referred to as Ayres and
Miller).
80. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
81. - F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1974), 6 ERC 1363.
sion limitation against a municipal incinerator82 rather than permit
-a year's variance, Federal District Judge Robinson stated:
Defendants also dispute Plaintiffs' standing to sue. As noted the
Act allows "any person" to file suit to enforce clean air standards.
Nevertheless this does not, as Plaintiffs seem to arguably dispense
with the necessity that such a person demonstrate a sufficient in-
terest in the specific controversy as to meet traditional concepts of
standing. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) set forth the
test for standing as allegation of an "injury in fact" attributable to
the challenged action of the Defendant. The Court finds that the
Complaints herein, though inartfully drawn, adequately allege in-jury to the health and property interests of the Plaintiff as resi-
dents of the locality in which the emission violations occur.83
While Sierra Club v. Morton was a suit where review was sought
under the Administrative Procedure Act,8 4 it seems apparent that
a plaintiff or group of plaintiffs would have no difficulty in estab-
lishing standing under section 304. The difficulty arises in inter-
preting whether Congress by enacting the stction, and in specifying
that suits brought under it do not have to satisfy either a jurisdic-
tional amount requirement or diversity of citizenship, intended that
plaintiffs' standing to bring suit would be controlled by a case de-
cided two years after enactment of the section and which concerns
another law. We note that the Sierra criteria can be met rather
easily,85 but an additional test to be met does not seem to be carry-
ing out the Congressional purpose.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, enacted after
Sierra, has, for practical purposes, clarified this difficulty for this
observer. In its citizen suit section, the FWPCA says "any citizen
may commence a civil action .... 86 "Citizen" is defined in subsec-
tion (g) to mean "a person or persons having an interest which
is or may be adversely affected. '8 7 It is EPA's position this defini-
tion was added by the Conference Committee to reflect the decision
in Sierra Club v. Morton,88 Providing a precedent for EPA's inter-
82. The author took part in another Clean Air Act case involving an in-
cinerator which resulted in a federal order under section 113 and the same
date for ceasing operations as the federal order required in an order of the
State of Illinois Pollution Control Board. See, Ill. EPA v. Village of Skokie,
PCB 74-74 (May 23, 1974), and U.S. EPA In re Village of Skokie, Municipal
Incinerator, Order No. EPA-5-A-74-18 (April 2, 1974).
83. Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 6 ERC at 1365.
84. Adm. Procedure Act, § 10: 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
85. Judge James L. Oakes, Developments in Environmental Law, 3 ENV.
REP. 50001, 50002 (1973); reprinted in substantially the same form, Environ-
mental Litigation: Current Developments and Suggestions for the Future,
5 CoNN. L. REv. 531 (1973). [Hereinafter referred to as OAKEs.]
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1972).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1972).
88. Preamble, Prior Notice of Citizen Suits, 38 Fed. Reg. 15040 (1973),
40 C.F.R. Part 35.
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pretation is another decision of the District Court of the District
of Columbia. In Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Fri,89 de-
fendants said that the complaining community groups lacked stand-
ing because they failed to allege that they or their members would
be adversely affected by defendants' actions. Applying this Sierra
criterion of "adversely affected" even though the suit was brought
under section 505, the court stated:
While the statutory language relied on for standing in the instant
case is arguably broader in scope than that relied on in Sierra, the
Court takes note of congressional intent behind section 1365(g)
which sought to base standing requirements on those pronounced
in Sierra. Applying the Sierra guidelines to plaintiff community
groups, the Court finds that standing has been established. 90
Therefore, while the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act
is also "arguably broader," to be safe one should allege the Sierra
criterion of "adversely affected." Indeed, Sierra has turned out to
be merely a pleading decision.91 The Sierra Club amended its com-
plaint and alleged that its members would be affected in their ac-
tivities by the proposed Disney development, and the amendment
was found sufficient.92  The "liberalized law of standing" as de-
veloped in Barlow93 and Data Processing94 appears, then, to remain
as the standard for bringing suit under the Clean Air Act. Even
with the statutory provision, the plaintiff must allege "injury in
fact" or such a "personal stake" in the controversy to ensure preser-
vation of a genuine adversary context.95
Jurisdiction, not standing, however, has proven to be the key pro-
cedural issue. U.S. Steel v. Fri96 illustrates the problem of basing
jurisdiction on section 304. When section 304 was first proposed
and enacted, commentators were concerned mostly with the pos-
sibility of citizen suits disrupting EPA enforcement programs by
reordering the priorities or the difficulties in coordinating citizen
89. 366 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1973).
90. Id. at 1210.
91. Oakes, supra note 85, at 50002.
92. Sierra Club v. Morton, 348 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
93. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
94. Assn. of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
95. See generally Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L.
REv. 450 (1970).
96. United States Steel Corp. v. Fri, 364 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ind. 1973).
suits with the whole regulatory scheme 7 They failed to read the
statute as Judge Beamer did in the U.S. Steel case. In granting
pre-enforcement review to some matters in an EPA order, the
Judge held: "Although both parties have ignored the provision,
the Court finds that section 1857h-2(304) of the Act clearly provides
jurisdiction."0 8 The Judge based his decision on the savings clause,
section 304(e):
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person
(or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law
to seek enforcement of any emission standard or limitation or to
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or
a State agency).99
The Judge's reasoning was that review was not precluded because
the dispute concerns the legal sufficiency of the Administrator's or-
der-an enforcement matter. The case is unlike Getty Oil'00 where
EPA enforced a Deleware air implementation plan regulation
against the DELMARVA electric company and its fuel supplier
Getty objected to the regulation as being unreasonable and adopted
improperly. The Third Circuit held in Getty Oil that the company
was foreclosed from challenging the regulation and plan in an en-
forcement case and should have challenged the plan under Section
307 of the Clean Air Act. Judge Beamer, however, is saying that
challenging specific aspects of an EPA order prior to enforcement
of that order is permitted under section 304.
While agreeing with Judge Beamer that section 304 concerns en-
forcement matters, we disagree that an action initiated under an-
other section of the same Act can be bootstrapped into the savings
clause and section 304. The savings clause concerns actions under
other statutes or at common law.10 ' To find that the polluter him-
97. Crampton and Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril
Or Promise?, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 407, 427 (1972). Some of these fears have been
justified as the EPA Administrator approved state implementation plans not
providing for transportation and land use controls for air quality mainte-
nance or plans having provisions to prevent deterioration of air quality in
regions already meeting the air quality standards (non-degradation). See,
respectively, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968
(D.C. Cir. 1973), and Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.
1972), af'd, 4 ERC 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff1d by an equally divided Court
sub nom., Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
98. United States Steel Corp. v. Fri., 364 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (N.D. Ind.
1973).
99. Id. at 1019.
100. Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp.
1006 (D. Del. 1972), remanded, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
101. Senate Comm. on Public Works, Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollu-
tion, National Air Quality Standards Act of 1970, Sen. Report No. 91-1116,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sen. Rep.]
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self gets judicial review, not under the enforcement section (113),
but under a supplemental enforcement provision seems to turn the
intent of the provision topsy-turvy. Section 304 appears to be
invocable in the case of enforcement orders under section 113
only when the Administrator's order is not sufficient with respect
to an emission limitation or standard under the Act or when the
Administrator is not enforcing his order. Section 304 is not in-
tended to grant pre-enforcement review to the very receiver of
such an order. The Administrator's action may be reviewed in ac-
cordance with section 113 or the Administrative Procedure Act.
Two decisions, although not directly concerned with EPA en-
forcement actions, have denied review to companies challenging the
Administrator's adoption of certain regulations in state imple-
mentation plans. These companies brought suit under section 304
when they should have challenged such adoption under section 307.
In West Penn. Power v. Train,10 2 the court found that section 304
did not allow judicial review of a regulation prohibiting use of tall
stacks to attain air quality under the Pennsylvania implementation
plan. The court said, "A reference to 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5 (Section
110) shows that the Administrator has ample discretion in de-
termining approval of state plans and hence it is the holding of
this court that no suit will lie under 1857h-2."'0 3 Using the reason-
ing of Getty Oil and Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA,10 4 the court found
that section 307 designated an exclusive forum for judicial review.
Review by federal courts of actions taken by the Administrator
is circumscribed by section 307(b) (1). It provides that petitions
for review of the Administrator's actions approving implementation
plans are to be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the
appropriate circuit, within thirty days of the date of the Adminis-
trator's approval. Subsection (2) of 307 (b) forecloses later litiga-
tion in enforcement proceedings of issues for which review could
have been had under section 307 (b) (1).105
In Anaconda v. Ruckelshaus,10 6 the Tenth Circuit held that sec-
tion 304 does not provide jurisdiction for a district court to hear a
suit asserting that the Administrator should have prepared a Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act environmental impact statement
102. - F. Supp. - (W.D. Pa. 1974), 6 ERC 1722.
103. Id. at 1724.
104. 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973).
105. Id. at 4.
106. Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973).
concerning the proposed Montana implementation plan.107 The
Court of Appeals reasoned that in the statute Congress specifically
provided that review of an implementation plan be filed only in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or
for the appropriate circuit. "The intent of Congress to make the
Court of Appeals the exclusive forum is apparent from that word-
ing." 0 8 The Court, citing Getty Oil, continued,
To allow review by way of injunction in the case at bar could only
serve to cause delay and to take the case up in a district court re-
moved from the scene is not appropriate either, for it could conceiv-
ably encourage forum shopping and the thwarting of procedures
which Congress has carefully adopted. It follows then that where,
as here, Congress has specifically designated a forum for judicial
review of administrative action and does so in unmistakable terms
except under extraordinary conditions, that forum is exclusive. 0 1
The Anaconda court also stated that since the regulation was
merely a proposed one, the case was not ripe for injunctive relief.
This going to court prematurely against the EPA Administrator has
occurred in other cases. In Plan for Arcadia v. Anita Associates,'"
the District Court for the Central District of California held:
"Since the plaintiffs' only remedy under the Act is against persons
who are in violation of regulations promulgated under the Act and
since no regulations have been promulgated with respect to shop-
ping centers, it follows that no cause of action is stated against the
corporate defendants.""' The court went on to dismiss the com-
plaint against all parties, since section 304 does not authorize a suit
against the EPA or the state where there is no regulation for the
governmental bodies to enforce.
In Pinkney v. OEPA,"1 2 the District Court of Northern Ohio fol-
lowed Anaconda in stating that suits challenging EPA actions in
107. Challenges both by citizen groups and industry have been against
EPA for not filing impact statements when promulgating regulations under
the Clean Air Act. See, e.g., Getty Oil, 342 F. Supp. 1006, and Buckeye
Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973). In the FWPCA this issue
has been clarified by 33 U.S.C. § 1371 (1972) to not require impact state-
ments under most regulatory circumstances.
108. Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1304 (10th Cir. 1973).
109. Id. at 1304-05.
110. 6 ERC 1606 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
111. Id. at 1607.
112. Pinkney v. Ohio EPA, 6 ERC 1625, 1 PCG Par. 15060 (N.D. Ohio
1974). But cf., Citizens Assn. of Georgetown v. Washington, 370 F. Supp.
1101 (D.D.C. 1974), which was in accord with Pinkney in stating that juris-
diction does not lie under § 304; however, the District Court, Judge Richey,
found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, since a substantial federal ques-
tion exists. The Court deferred to the administrative judgment of EPA in
finding that retroactive application of the indirect source review procedures
was both inequitable and unnecessary to air quality. Concerning the Pink-
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promulgating regulations under the Clean Air Act must be raised
in federal appeals court rather than a federal district court. In
dismissing this class action suit brought on behalf of the residents
of Cuyahoga County-which charged that creation of a shopping
center would cause the violation of ambient air quality standards
and that Ohio had violated the Clean Air Act by failing to adopt
indirect source regulations and that the EPA had improperly ex-
tended by 180 days the effective date of federal indirect source regu-
lations-Judge Lambros also ruled that the litigants had failed to
observe the mandatory 60 day prefiling notice requirement of sec-
tion 304.
Before discussing the notice requirement of section 304, one other
case should be mentioned as strongly limiting jurisdiction of federal
district courts under section 304. In Arizona Public Service Com-
pany v. Fri,"3 complainants sought damages and injunctive relief
in federal district court. The power companies charged that EPA
approval of a state implementation plan amounted to inverse con-
demnation, denied them due process and violated NEPA. The Ari-
zona District Court held that such claims should have been pre-
sented in the Court of Appeals. The court followed Anaconda in
making clear that a plaintiff cannot forum shop among courts to
obtain jurisdiction.
In contrast, the nondegradation case of Sierra Club v. Ruckels-
haus" 4 shows clearly that given the right issue a plaintiff can ob-
tain jurisdiction under section 304 even if there is no emission stand-
ney case and its meaning, the author wishes to acknowledge the assistance
of Attorney Ronald Mastriana of the Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation of
Youngstown, Ohio, for supplying him with the pleadings. The author,
while with Region V wrote the first two letters determining that indirect
source review was not applicable for two developments. There have been
over 52 lawsuits filed concerning indirect source review and the EPA regu-
lations, 39 Fed. Reg. 25292 (July 9, 1974), 40 C.F.R. Part 52, § 52.22(b).
The term "indirect source" is defined to mean a facility, building, structure,
or installation which attracts or may attract mobile source activity (e.g.,
automobiles) that results in emissions of a pollutant (e.g., carbon monoxide,
ozone) for which there is a national standard. Indirect sources include
highways, parking facilities, shopping centers, airports and office buildings.
The author foresees more federal land use planning under the Clean Air
Act, see generally, Mandelker and Rothschild, The Role of Land-Use Con-
trols in Combating Air Pollution under the Clean Air Act of 1970, 3 EcoL-
OGY L.Q. 235 (1973).
113. - F. Supp. - (D. Ariz. 1973), 5 ERC 1878.
114. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 4 ERC 1205 (1972).
ard or limitation to enforce and a definite lack of the same. Judge
Pratt of the District of Columbia held that EPA failed to perform
a non-discretionary act by not requiring nondegradation provisions
in state implementation plans. Furthermore, the case was "pre-
cisely the type of claim which Congress, through 52 U.S.C. §1857h-
2(a), intended interested citizens to raise in the district courts. u15
The Judge concluded that the Act is based, in important part, on
a policy of non-degradation and that the Administrator had no right
to permit the states to submit air pollution control plans which
would allow pollution levels of clean air to rise to the secondary
standard level of pollution.
It is unfortunate, but several of the actions brought under section
304 have been severely handicapped due to procedural errors either
inadvertently, or perhaps knowingly, made.116 Lawyers have not
followed, or in some cases have not wanted to follow, the procedural
rules governing the giving of notice required by subsection 304(b)
of the Act as a prerequisite for commencing the lawsuit. 117 Except
for a violation of an EPA order or a hazardous pollutant standard,
plaintiffs must give 60 days notice to the Administrator. Concern-
ing this procedural requirement, Judge Decker said in Highland
Park v. Train:"18
Not only is strict adherence mandated by the statute, it is sup-
ported by compelling practical and policy considerations, especially
in cases of a complex nature such as the one before the court. Con-
gress was aware of the 60 days granted the United States, or an
officer or employee thereof, to answer complaints in civil suits ....
Had the drafters of the Act considered the Rule 12 period alone
to be sufficient, they would not also have required notice prior to
commencement of the suit."19
Judge Decker, besides pointing out the literal, statutory language,
gave several policy reasons for the 60-day period. The period led
to negotiated settlements.
Further, without the grace period, the EPA would be accorded only
a few days . . . to . . .prepare a response to, a difficult, multi-
count suit, seeking substantially more than mere ministerial action.
In addition, complex matters might necessitate deploying attorneys
from Washington. And, of course, institution of suit interrupts the
on-going process of regulation development and other substantive
EPA concerns. 120
115. Id. at 1206. For EPA proposals arising out of this case, see, 38 Fed.
Reg. 18986 (July 16, 1973), and Clean Air Mess, 104 Time Mag. 69 (Sept.
2, 1974).
116. Sometimes cases have been brought to gain publicity for the lawyer
rather than to win for the client.
117. 40 C.F.R. Part 54.
118. - F. Supp. - (N.D. IIl. 1974), 6 ERC 1464.
119. Id. at 1469.
120. Id.
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This observer of EPA action finds that Judge Decker is on firm
ground when he examines the statutory intent of the 60-day notice
period, but finds that EPA's enforcement and rule-making activities
continue until altered by judicial decisions-the initiation of a law
suit is hardly enough to slow or enough to quicken the bureau-
cratic process.
Standing opposed to Judge Decker's opinion is that of Judge Hill's
in Riverside v. Ruckelshaus: 1
There has been .. . actual constructive compliance by plaintiffs
with the sixty-day notice provision ... in that:
2) Sixty days elapsed between the filing date and the date that
hearing on plaintiffs' request for injunction was complete and this
Court rendered its judgment.
3) During that sixty day period the Administrator had all the bene-
ficial effect of the sixty day notice provision, so the purposes of
the provision were fulfilled.
122
Judge Decker, in referring to Riverside's holding that personal
service upon the Administrator, together with a lapse of 60 days
between filing and completion of hearing for a preliminary injunc-
tion, was adequate for jurisdiction, said: "Such an approach to the
notice provision constitutes, in effect, judicial amendment in abro-
gation of explicit, unconditional statutory language and this court
respectively declines so to ignore or modify the notice require-
ment."'
23
The district court in the Pinkney case also discussed the notice
requirement and interpreted the "savings clause" subsection 304(e)
the same way as the author did above in United States Steel v.
Fri:
2 4
The proceeding language, however, clearly refers to suits arising
under laws other than the Clean Air Act. Indeed, any other inter-
pretation would render the notice requirements meaningless be-
cause suits for violations would regularly be filed without prior no-
tice. Moreover, this is the interpretation suggested by the legisla-
tive history of the Act.
Since all three of plaintiffs' statutory claims are based on rights
arising under the Clean Air Act, subsection (e) does not exempt
121. - F. Supp. - (C.D. Cal. 1972), 4 ERC 1728.
122. Id. at 1731.
123. - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ill. 1974), 6 ERC 1464, 1469.
124. See notes 77-78 and 96-101, supra, and accompanying text.
plaintiffs from the mandatory 60-day notice requirement prior to
commencing suit.125
This review of the notice requirement of section 304, which was
purposefully made simple,126 leads one to agree for entirely differ-
ent reasons with Ayres and Miller: "In suits against polluters it
may not be as benign as it would first appear."'127 Ayres and Mil-
ler were worried about state officials bringing their own suit during
the 60-day period to head off citizen suits; instead, the record shows
that too many cases have been handicapped because attorneys have
ignored as a trifling formality the 60-day notice requirement. To
this observer, the 60-day notice requirement is not simply another
formality. This author has personally seen and developed cases
brought to his attention through the notification to the EPA Ad-
ministrator 60 days before commencing suit. He has also seen cases
where the Administrator has taken some action and that action has
been enough to alleviate the condition or mollify the complainant.
Other cases have, of course, not worked out as well; in these cases
the Administrator and citizens have disagreed as to whether a vio-
lation of an emission limitation or state plan actually exists. The
important thing is that the author has seen the agency respond
to all formal citizen complaints under section 304. The agency has
responded with investigations and in many cases these investiga-
tions have led to EPA Notices of Violation and Orders under section
113 of the Clean Air Act. 2 8
In water pollution, the effect of the citizen suit provision has been
less pronounced in enforcement due to the relatively short time
the FWPCA has been in existence, but the District of Columbia
has commented on the notice requirement which parallels that of
the Clean Air Act:
In May 10, 1973, purported notices were given by plaintiff com-
munity groups to defendants Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,
Montgomery County Council, James Gleason, and Maryland Gov-
ernor Marvin Mandel. On June 1, 1973, the Administrator pre-
scribed notice regulations pursuant to section 1365 (b). 40 C.F.R. 135
et. seq.
125. Pinkney v. Ohio EPA, 6 ERC 1625, 1 PCG Par. 15436 (N.D. Ohio
1974).
126. Sen. Rep. at 37.
127. Ayres and Miller, supra note 79, at 4.
128. Citizen groups in Northwest Indiana (Gary area) gave notice to the
Administrator of EPA and to Region V, Midwest Region, that they would
bring suit against the steel mills in the area. Region V responded with
notices of violation and in some cases orders against the steel mills: includ-
ing United States Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Inland Steel, and Youngstown
Sheet and Tube.
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In view of the fact that the supplemental pleadings were filed
more than sixty days after the May 10th notice and in view of the
fact that said notice complied in full with the spirit of the Adminis-
trator's June 1st regulations, plaintiff community groups are found
to have given proper notice under section 1365 (b).
Accordingly, jurisdiction has been established by plaintiff com-
munity groups. 12 9
While the District of Columbia court was liberal in construing
the notice requirement above, the message of this section has been,
do not count on always finding this "trifling formality" waived by
the courts. In its way it is just as formal as the renowned Eisen
notice requirement.
After the formalities have been fulfilled, the issue arises anew
of who to sue and what to allege. Any person may bring suit
against any other person for violations of
(A) an emission standard or limitation... or (B) an order issued
by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard
or limitation, or ... against the Administrator where there is al-
leged a failure ... to perform any act or duty . .. which is not
discretionary. .. 130
Section 304(f) defines the term "emission standard" or limitation:
(1) a schedule or timetable of compliance, emission limitation,
standard of performance or emission standard, or (2) a control or
prohibition respecting a motor vehicle fuel or fuel additive, which
is in effect under this chapter ... or under an applicable imple-
mentation plan.131
We have previously outlined the Act and the regulations it estab-
lishes. All these regulations can be enforced using section 304. A
problem arises, however, when the Administrator refuses to take
action on the grounds that the action is discretionary with the
agency. The Administrator argues in enforcement cases that he
has discretion to take action under the rubric of "prosecutorial dis-
cretion.' 132  For example, a citizen serves notice that unless the
129. Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Fri, 366 F. Supp. 261, 1213(D.D.C. 1973). But cf. NRDC v. Train, 6 ERC 1033 (D.D.C. 1973), where
the court stated that EPA's failure to publish within one year of enactment
of 1972 FWPCA final § 304(b) (1) (A) effluent limitation guidelines vio-
lated the Act and required a court order establishing a publication schedule
for guidelines that provides for final publication of all guidelines by No-
vember 29, 1974.
130. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857h-2 (a) (1) and (2) (1970).
131. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857h-2(f) (1970).
132. K. DAvis, Pnos~cuTomL DisciumoN (1971). The author participated
in one case where a citizens group filed a complaint against EPA for not
Administrator issues a notice of violation under section 113 to a
polluter within 60 days, the Administrator and the polluter will
be sued for a violation of the state implementation plan. In other
words, may citizens successfully sue the EPA to compel Federal
enforcement against violators of emission standards or limitations?
The EPA has argued that decisions with respect to Federal enforce-
ment can be considered discretionary.
The answer to this problem turns not just on the meaning of
"shall" in the enforcement section of the Clean Air Act, but con-
cerns the legislative history of section 304. The enacted version
of section 304 differs from the original provision in the Senate re-
port. The Senate bill would have given the courts jurisdiction
to enforce, or to require the enforcement to any applicable schedule
or timetable of compliance, emission requirement, standard of per-
formance, emission standard, or prohibition established pursuant to
this Act. Civil actions for such enforcement, or to require such en-
forcement, may be brought ... against the Secretary where there
is alleged a failure of the Secretary to exercise (i) his authority
to enforce standards or orders established under this Act; or (ii)
any duty established by this Act.133
Had the Senate version been enacted, it sems clear that any per-
son would have been able to sue the Administrator for enforcement
against any violator. The Senate report reenforces this view:
The Committee bill would provide in the citizen suit provision that
actions will lie against the Secretary for failure to exercise his
duties under the Act; including his enforcement duties. The Com-
mittee expects that many citizen suits would be of this nature, since
such suits would reduce the ultimate burden on the citizen of going
forward with the entire action.'3 4
The enacted language, however, narrows the scope of citizen ac-
tions against the Administrator and the conference report says,
"Suits against the Administrator are limited to alleged failure to
perform mandatory functions to be performed by him." 135  Re-
finding a violation of the state implementation plan where the state ada-
mantly set forth the position that it had acted in accordance with the pro -er
administrative procedures and there would be no air quality violation.
The bi-level or even tri-level jurisdictional basis of the Clean Air Act often
does provide situations where one air pollution control agency may be in
disagreement with another. In the case of Wisconsin's Environmental Dec-
ade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Power and Light Co., Complaint filed January 17,
1974, W.D. Wis., both the federal and state agencies agreed not to take ac-
tion pursuant to the citizen suit for the power plant development had been
reviewed for compliance with applicable regulations previously and the
matter had been litigated in Dane County Circuit Court. See text at 127,
supra. Does section 304 (b) (1) (B) apply to this situation?
133. Sen. Rep. at 122-23.
134. Id. at 38-39.
135. Id.. at 36.
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marks by legislators also stress this limitation. 3" Finally, a letter
from HEW Secretary Richardson to the Conference Committee
prior to issuance of the conference report should be considered in
determining the Administrator's discretion in reaction to section
304:
The authorization of citizen suits against the Secretary to force him
to take enforcement action in a particular case would have the un-
intended result of reducing the overall effectiveness of our air pol-
lution control efforts by distorting enforcement priorities that are
essential to an effective national control strategy. Therefore, we
recommend the deletion of that portion of the provision authorizing
suits against the Secretary. This deletion will not affect the right
of citizens to move directly against polluters, including the Federal
Government.137
Since the bill was altered, although not to the extent that Rich-
ardson wanted, the question of the Administrator's prosecutorial
discretion under the Act remains. The Richardson letter along with
the deletion of the enforcement language in the citizen suit provi-
sion of the Senate version indicates that the Administrator has dis-
cretion in enforcement related matters. The courts have also been
reluctant to interfere in enforcement activities, although the de-
cision not to enforce may be reviewable in some cases. 138
How MUCH FRuiT WmL THE TREE BEAR?
At the beginning of this article, we quoted a newspaper editorial
that concluded: "Now, high cost has again put justice out of the
reach of those most in need of it.' ' 3 9 The issues of attorneys fees,
damages, and group suits are the essential issues that challenge the
utility of citizen suit provisions. These topics have been discussed
numerous times in articles solely devoted to them; thus, this paper
will not do more than sketch out the arguments and refer to some
of the cases in the area. 140 We will, of course, emphasize the cases
that have arisen under the Clean Air Act, but we must point out
that the courts have vacillated in their decisions in cases involving
136. See Remarks of Rep. Staggers, House Manager, 116 CoNG. REzc.
H12061 (Dec. 18, 1970).
137. Letter, from HEW to conference committee, Nov. 10, 1970.
138. K. DAVIS, ADMINSTRATIvE LAW TREATISE, §28.16, at 982-990 (1972
Supp.).
139. Supra note 1.
140. See generally Note, The Allocation of Attorneys' Fees after Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 316 (1971).
the same subject matter. To a large extent, the more meritorious
the claim proves to be, the greater is the ultimate fee for the attor-
ney.
Regarding the citizen suit, whether it can be viewed as a substi-
tute for the classic, environmental class action depends on who will
'bear the costs of litigation and the eventual reward both to client
and attorney. How much fruit will the tree bear? While in theory
everyone has a right to litigate and seek a remedy for a right, there
is usually no successful outcome to a dispute without either money
from the client or a lawyer who forsees income from a case. This
is not to disparage the numerous lawyers who take cases pro bono
publico; however, in most situations to do justice both the lawyer
and client choose their opportunity. A parallel is the contingent
fee arrangement in automobile accident cases; some claims are
simply not worth litigating.141
The Clean Air Act and other environmental statutes are no excep-
tion to the general rule that the lawyer must still nurture and
water his fruit tree. The precedents for awarding attorneys' and
expert witness' fees are increasing in environmental litigation in-
volving other than class actions. The class action, though, still pre-
sents the possibility of accruing fantastic sums of money and exert-
ing a large amount of pressure for special causes. If one is able
to maneuver around the new obstacles established by Eisen and
Zahn, the class action presents the greatest opportunity for finan-
cial and probably psychic satisfaction. "'They are one of the last
outposts of free enterprise,' says New York attorney Edward Laba-
ton. 'You have to have a shop, maybe some capital, and you can
do big things.' ",142
The financial rewards of environmental litigation are hardly in
the same class, especially if one is suing a corporate polluter rather
than defending one, but the trend towards receiving reimbursement
in environmental litigation when claims are brought on behalf of
groups or the public at large, is increasing. For instance, litigation
under NEPA indicates that fees will be awarded despite another
federal act that prohibits the awarding of attorneys' fees and ex-
penses against the United States or any agency or official acting
in his official capacity. 43 In reaching a decision on the Alaskan
141. See Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environ-
mental Litigation, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1222, 1237-46 (1973).
142. Quoted in Andrews, The Class Action Bar: It's All Cat and Mouse,
4 Juais DOCTOR 18 (January 1974).
143. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412; used in Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 ERC 1231
-(C.D. Cal. 1972).
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pipeline, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
Judge Skelly Wright presiding, held that groups challenging, under
NEPA and the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, the construction of
the pipeline, were entitled to an equitable award of attorneys' fees
and costs, even though the groups did not obtain the judicial relief
requested.144 The groups were entitled to fees because the suit
served the public interest by insuring compliance with NEPA and
by focusing debate on the relative merits of trans-Alaskan and
trans-Canadian pipeline routes. The reasoning apparently followed
that of Judge Peckham from the Northern District of California
in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 45 where both attorneys' and expert
witness' fees were awarded against the California Highway Depart-
ment.
The basis of the award was that the suit helped enforce a congres-
sional policy in an environmental action; the court took the lead
from the "private attorney-general concept," advanced by Judges
Wisdom and Johnson in segregation and civil rights cases. Judge
Peckham held that the following factors should be considered in
deciding whether the "private attorney general concept" is appli-
cable: (a) strength of congressional policy, (b) the number of
people benefited by the litigant's efforts, and (c) the necessity and
financial burden of private enforcement.146
In deciding whether a private attorney would handle a class ac-
tion, the same factors of Judge Peckham would still be important-
especially, the number of people benefited and the burden of en-
forcement. However, carrying out the intent of congressional pol-
icy of serving the public interest while serving your clients' interest,
appears to be an essential element in collecting a fee under citizen
suit provisions. In Delaware Citizens v. Stauffer Chemical,1 47 Dis-
trict Judge Stapleton interpreted section 304's provision providing
for the award of litigation costs as being highly discretionary with
the court. Despite section 304(d) that does not allow for awards
to a prevailing party, Judge Stapleton felt that awarding of costs
is still an extraordinary remedy.
As earlier suggested, however, I do not believe good faith alone
should require an award of attorney's fees to an unsuccessful liti-
gant under Section 304. While I do not fault plaintiff for instituting
144. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 6 ERC 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
145. 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971), 1 ELR 20642 (N.D. Calif. 1971),
2 ELR 20691 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
146. Oakes, supra note 85, at 50004.
147. 6 ERC 1541 (D. Del. 1973).
this action when it did, I cannot say that this was the exceptional
kind of case in which the public interest requires a successful de-
fendant to pay the full costs of litigation. 148
The District Judge distinguished the case from the kind "in which
a recalcitrant polluter is left free to ignore Clean Air Act standards
simply because neither the state nor the federal enforcement agen-
cies possess the resources necessary to force his compliance."'14
The author dissents from the Judge's opinion. He suggests that
while there will be instances where the citizen is clearly acting un-
fairly in bringing suit against a polluter, in many cases, including
Stauffer, the citizen has a public duty to see that postponements,
variances, and schedules are developed and granted properly under
the Act. The citizen or citizen group, perhaps, should not be reim-
bursed by the polluter; but the state and federal agencies should
encourage citizen monitoring of their programs.150 The citizen suit
is intended not only as a supplemental enforcement device but also
to encourage viable, effective air pollution control programs. Such
a program should grant variances only as a matter of necessity and
demand compliance as expeditiously and as pragmatically as the
Clean Air Act mandates.15'
For cases awarding costs of litigation under the Clean Air Act,
we may examine two cases which challenged the Administrator's
action, and not that of the polluters, of approving state implemen-
tation plans. The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Natural Re-
source Defense Council v. EPA 5 2 interpreted section 304 to apply
also to section 307 suits. The successful petitioners in NRDC v.
EPA'153 requested the court to award them attorneys' fees as well
as costs against the EPA for their efforts in obtaining orders requir-
ing the EPA in Massachusetts and Rhode Island to comply with
certain of its obligations under the Clean Air Act, including plan
approval for air quality control regions, emission data availability,
and plan revisions. The court explored the history of awarding
attorneys' fees and other costs of litigation. It explained that orig-
148. Id. at 1543.
149. Id.
150. E.g., Region V EPA gives a small grant to the Air Conservation
Committee of the Northern Ohio Lung Association. Bucato, One Woman
versus 600 Smokestacks, March 1974 ENVIRONMENT MIDWEST 3 (published
by Region V, United States Environmental Protection Agency). The Con-
servation Committee through its Chairperson Pat Smith has filed to be a
party to 140 variance hearings being held pursuant to Ohio law and the
Clean Air Act. Besides § 304, § 110 (a) of the Act encourages public par-
ticipation (42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (a) (1970)).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970). See generally Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974).
152. 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973).
153. 478 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1973).
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inally attorneys' fees might be taxed to a private party who had
sued or defended in bad faith. Attorneys' fees have also been
awarded in equity proceedings where a plaintiff recovered through
the litigation a fund in which others were entitled to share. Build-
ing upon this fund rationale, the First Circuit discussed the eco-
nomic concept of spreading costs of litigation equitably among all
the beneficiaries of an action and encouraging suits which promote
the public interest. The court then analyzed whether sovereign im-
munity barred the suit and if section 304(d) allowed fees in district
court, but said nothing about suits brought directly in the federal
appellate courts as required by section 307(b). The court agreed
with the Senate Report, which stated: "... in bringing legitimate
actions under this section citizens [are] performing a public service
and in such instances the courts should award costs of litigation
to such party."'154 The Court also touched upon the concept that
no award of fees would be made in frivolous litigation, and it
pointed out the public service done by NRDC through this litiga-
tion.
We are at liberty to consider not merely "who won" but what bene-
fits were conferred. The purpose of an award of costs and fees is
not mainly punitive. It is to allocate the costs of litigation equi-
tably, to encourage the achievement of statutory goals. When the
government is attempting to carry out a program of such vrst and
unchartered dimensions, there are roles for both the official agency
and a private watchdog. The legislation is itself novel and com-
plex. Given the implementation dates, its early interpretation is
desirable. It is our impression, overall, that petitioners, in their
watchdog role, have performed a service. 155
However, petitioners, by volunteering and performing this public
service, did not receive quite the financial reward that attorneys
litigating solely for private clients might have received.
We must also recognize that petitioners, as surrogate attorneys for
the interests of the public and the EPA, have volunteered and 'im-
posed' their services on 'clients' that never contracted for them. As
attorneys for involuntary clients, their fees may properly be less
than those they could have received by entering the marketplace
and selling their services to the private client who would make
the highest bid for them.150
As an aside, we must point out, as the court did elsewhere, in the
154. Sen. Rep. at 38, cited in NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1337 (1st Cir.
1973).
155. Id. at 1338.
156. Id. at 1339.
opinion, that "only the public-certainly not the polluter-has the
incentive to complain if the EPA falls short."'01 7
Regarding the issue of what is a "reasonable" attorneys' fee, the
non-degradation case of Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus'5 8 reoccurs in
our discussion. An award of fees commensurate with what affluent
private litigants would have had to pay ($48,000) was granted the
Sierra Club in this case. The Sierra Club also won an award of fees
although it lost the case in an action brought under NEPA. A Texas
district court reasoned in Sierra Club v. Lynn, 50 that the plaintiffs
had caused the defendants to incorporate into their plans for a
housing project environmentally protective features that would
otherwise have been excluded. "With those provisions, the project
was held to have satisfied the requirements of NEPA. Since the
plaintiffs had succeeded in principle, the court -was not to be dis-
suaded from awarding counsel fees by the fact that "technically"
they had lost the case." 160
The successes of NRDC and the Sierra Club point out a newly
emerging factor in environmental litigation-the group litigator.
This factor may be making the class action less essential as citizens
band together in groups to bear the cost of litigation. Group litiga-
tion has seemingly become more popular since the clarification of
what a group needs for standing under Sierra Club v. Morton.101
For any group bringing an action, the best advice as gained from
Sierra Club v. Morton is to allege that the group's members would
be affected in their property, activity, or in some other manner.
As these groups become more assertive of their rights under citi-
zen suit and other provisions, the cost of financing environmental
litigation should shift to the government and the polluter. That
is, as more cases are won by environmentalists, and attorneys' fees
and expert witnesses' fees are awarded, "the costs can increasingly
be assumed either -by the parties which cause or threaten the en-
vironmental damage, or by the public at large which benefits from
the environmentalists' work."' 62 This watchdog role is being per-
formed not only by national groups on a national basis, such as
NRDC and the Sierra Club, but by local chapters of groups like
Citizens for a Better Environment, the Izaak Walton League, and
157. Id. at 1334.
158. Supra note 97, and discussion at notes 114, 115, supra.
159. 3 ELR 20664 (W.D. Texas 1973).
160. Attorney's Fees: The Growing Number of Awards to Public Interest
Plaintiffs, 4 ENv. RF_. 10021, 10022 (1974). [Hereinafter cited as Attorney's
Fees.]
161. See discussion at note 80, supra.
162. Attorney's Fees, supra note 160, at 10022.
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the Tuberculosis Society. In Chicago, a group called Businessmen
for the Public Interest even assisted the City of Gary, Indiana, in a
lawsuit against U.S. Steel.6
33
To promote further improvement of the environment by citizen
suit actions, one more question needs answering: Are damages re-
coverable in actions brought under the citizen suit provision? Un-
der the Clean Air Act, the conservative answer would be that the
citizen suit provision does not provide for recovery of damages.
One commentator has stated,
For the court to imply a private right to recover damages for
air quality standard violations is to disregard the substantive rights
test set out in Bell. The 1970 Amendments do not establish a sub-
stantive right. The right established is broad and general; it pro-
vides for air of a certain quality, but does not purport to protect
individuals from property damage or personal injury.164
While the commentator may be correct in stating that the Clean
Air Act does not provide a right to recover damages, we feel his
conclusion that the Clean Air Act does not purport to protect indi-
viduals from property damage or personal injury is incorrect. In-
deed, the statutory scheme is to establish primary air quality stand-
ards to protect the public health and secondary standards to protect
the public welfare. Such standards apply respectively to the im-
pact of air pollution on human health, and the adverse effects of
air pollution on property, vegetation, and materials. 6 5 Other com-
mentators have discussed the possibility of whether a judgment in
a section 304 citizen suit can serve as a basis for summary judgment
in a subsequent class action or nuisance suit for damages against
the same defendant? 166
163. This list is certainly not meant to be inclusive. The outcome of the
Businessmen for the Public Interest (BPI) action was U.S. Steel v. Gary,
4 ERC 1273 (Indiana Superior Court, Lake County, May 22, 1972).
164. Note, Environmental Protection: A Limited Expansion of the Citi-
zen's Role, 12 WASHBURN L. J. 54, 61 (1972).
165. 40 C.F.R. Part 50. The air quality standards are to reflect the latest
scientific knowledge on the effect on public health and welfare which may
be expected from the presence of pollutants in the air. Currently, the six
criteria pollutants are particulate matter, sulfur oxides, photochemical oxi-
dants, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen dioxide. § 108 (42
U.S.C. § 1857c-3) requires the Administrator of EPA to list each pollutant,
and section 109 (42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4) requires the establishment of air qual-
ity standards. The primary standard is to protect the public health and
and the secondary standard is to protect the public welfare.
166. Ayres and Miller, supra note 79, at 2.
In a Section 304 suit against a polluter, the issue before the federal
court would be whether the polluter has violated an applicable
'emission standard or limitation.' In a nuisance action, however,
the issue is often whether the defendant's conduct constitutes an
"unreasonable" interference with the plaintiff's health or use of his
property, and proof that he violated an applicable emission stand-
ard or limitation might not necessarily be considered dispositive on
this issue.iU7
My comment would be that the suit for damages should not have
to be a separate action; it could be an added count similar to the
United States suit against Reserve Mining where the federal com-
mon law count is attached to the counts charging violations of the
federal water pollution control law and the River and Harbors
Act.168 Already in an action for damages by 37 persons against
three large polluters in the Detroit, Michigan area, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has noted the applicability of the
federal common law of nuisance and the citizen suit provision of
the Clean Air Act.10 We would argue that eventually an action
for damages will be combined with an action for injunctive relief
under section 304. The savings clause of section 304 (section 304
(e)) would seemingly preserve the damage action even if a court
held that the actions could not be combined. Some observers have
argued that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would allow the
action for damages to be combined with the section 304 suit.
Pendent jurisdiction allows a federal court to hear a non-federal
claim along with a federal claim against the same defendanst with-
out meeting the normal jurisdiction and amount in controversy re-
quirements. The federal claim must be substantial and the non-
federal and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of
operative facts. If plaintiffs' claims ordinarily would be tried in
one proceeding and the federal claim is substantial, federal courts
have the power to hear the non-federal claim. Considerations of
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants are the bases
of pendent jurisdiction.170
Regarding whether a violation of the Act per se would allow for
the collection of damages, the answer is apparently no. The con-
gressional intent was clearly to provide for civil relief in the form
of abatement orders. Where there is a knowing violation of such
an order, hazardous emission standard, or new source performance
standard there are to be criminal penalties. 171 Despite this intent,
we are sure that learned counsel in attempting to gather a little
167. Id.
168. United States v. Reserve Mining, 6 ERC 1657 (D.C. Minn. 1974).
169. Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, 6 ERC 1444, 1446 (6th Cir.
1974).
170. Note, Plaintiffs' Use of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 12
WASHBURN L.J. 331, 341 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Use].
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970); see generally Sen. Rep.
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more fruit from the tree will make an argument similar to that
presented in a note in the Washburn Law Journal.172 The writer
argues that section 304, if read literally, means federal courts are
authorized to award money damages in citizen suits brought under
the Clean Air Act. He says that "civil action" literally defined in-
cludes actions to recover damages. 1'7 3 The writer then makes an
argument from statutory construction. He contrasts the detail on
remedy in the administrative enforcement section 113 with the lack
of detail in section 304.174 While one should agree with the author
that an argument can be made, his construction of the statutory
intent appears to be based on finding ambiguities which are there
for the basic reason that Congress never intended to provide a civil
damage remedy; Occam's Razor could well be sharpened on his stat-
utory intent argument. Finally, the author argues that the "im-
plied remedy doctrine" could be used to argue that where there
is a breach of a statute and one is injured who does not have ade-
quate relief the court will extend an adequate remedy through im-
plication. 175 One hopes with the writer in the Washburn Law Jour-
nal that the courts will allow a civil remedy for damages under
section 304, but we do not foresee this occurring. The author, how-
ever, does present an excellent listing of the practical reasons for
awarding civil damages. Many of the same advantageous, utilitar-
ian reasons apply to other forms of environmental litigation, includ-
ing class actions. He states that a civil damages remedy under the
Act would serve several purposes: (1) provide relief to injured per-
sons; (2) act as a deterrent and an enforcement device; (3) encour-
age citizens to litigate; and (4) compensate citizens for injury and
efforts to abate pollution.' 7 6 These practical reasons may someday
outweigh in a court's mind the wording and legislative history of
section 304.1'7 It will, however, have to be the right lawsuit, in
the right court, brought at the right time.
CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to show that the proper lawsuit may
172. Plaintiffs' Use, supTa note 170, at 331.
173. Id. at 332.
174. Id. at 333-34.
175. Id. at 335-36.
176. Id. at 337.
177. Sen. Rep. at 38.
.be a citizen suit action utilizing section 304 of the Clean Air Act.
It has also pointed out similar provisions in other federal environ-
mental legislation, and discussed several cases brought to imple-
ment the National Environmental Policy Act. Finally, it has been
shown that the environmental class action has been limited by the
Zahn and Eisen cases. There are, however, many avenues unex-
plored by this paper for bringing environmental actions. Many of
these causes of action can fit into the class action format or comple-
ment the citizen suit format. Indeed, since citizen suits under the
federal acts can be brought by any person, they can be brought
by a class or classes as the term "person" is defined. These other
forms of action may include the nuisance action,178 whether public
or private, a tort action,179 based on negligence or strict liability,
or even actions based on constitutional grounds. s0 The remedies
sought include damages and injunctive relief. Before concluding
this paper, the author will discuss in brief a few cases that illustrate
other ways lawyers have attempted to get fruit from the tree in
environmental litigation.
In Hagedorn v. Union Carbide,'8s a West Virginia district court
examined the constitutional arguments and determined that neither
the Fifth, Ninth, nor Fourteenth Amendments allowed it to hear
a case brought as a class action by plaintiffs alleging "that Union
Carbide's smokestacks belch 'dirt, graphite, dust and particles,
gases, fumes and other substances,' amounting to a 'rain of pollut-
ants'. .. "182 The district court felt that the precedent of Tanner
v. Armco Steel Corporation'83 was too strong. In Tanner, plaintiffs
too brought a class action alleging harm from air pollution, and
unlike Hagedorn which also had a Clean Air Act count which was
dismissed on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, plaintiffs alleged as
their statutory basis for recovery the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act and the Civil Rights Act as well as the same constitutional
grounds as mentioned in Hagedorn. The court refused to find a
legally enforceable right to a healthful environment giving rise to
an action for damages based upon the Constitution, and found that
"to the extent that an environmental controversy such as this is
presently justiciable, it is within the province of the law of torts,
to wit: nuisance."'184
178. See generally Comment, supra note 3, at 533. Almost every article
this author has seen cites for a nuisance action, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
179. W. PRossER, LAw or TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
180. See note 55, supra.
181. 363 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. W. Va. 1973).
182. Id. at 1063.
183. 340 F. Supp. 532 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
184. Id. at 537.
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There are problems, however, with nuisance suits whether
brought in the name of a class or brought on behalf of private in-
dividuals. A private action grounded on a theory of public nui-
sance will lie only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that he has suf-
fered damage different in kind from the rest of the community. 8 5
There must be proof of some direct personal damage rather than
merely that, for instance, air quality standards are exceeded over
the city. This is why it is normally easier to collect damages for
pollution from a source in an isolated area than from several
sources in an industrial area. 8 6 Even if the plant is in an isolated
area, the payment of damages can create problems similar to those
that confronted the Supreme Court in Zahn. In Nevada Cement
Company v. Lemler,8 7 the Supreme Court of Nevada in reversing
a damage award in a case involving pollution from a cement plant
stated:
It is entirely proper to order the payment of damages to compen-
sate for discomfort and annoyance caused by a temporary nuisance
. . . In this case, however, the record is clear that some of the
plaintiffs were considerably annoyed, while others were only mi-
nutely disturbed. Some of them lived near the cement plant, and
others were miles distant. Some were within prevailing wind pat-
terns and others were not .... Since the purpose of a general dam-
ege award is to compensate the aggrieved party for damage ac-
tually sustained, an identical award to multiple plaintiffs who are
dissimilarly situated is erroneous on its face. In the light of the
evidence, their annoyance and discomfort could not have been the
same. Consequently, we perceive no rational basis upon which to
affirm an award of $5,000 to each of them.' 88
185. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 86 (4th ed. 1971).
186. Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 45 Wis. 2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647
(1969). See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 902. The author participated on
July 18, 1972, in a closing of the Dairyland case. It, however, really was
not closed until an order of the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
(Order No. IA-72-06-01A) was approved in the Federal Register as part
of the Wisconsin implementation plan, 38 Fed. Reg. 12713 (May 14, 1973).
But cf., City of Chicago v. State Line Power Plant, 70 CCH 4022 (1973),
where the city was unable to prove special damages since there was much
industry in the vicinity although the power plant was much bigger than
the one damaging vegetation in the Dairyland Power cases. The city did,
however, claim a common law nuisance to bring an action against the plant
which was located 400 feet within Indiana. Eventually, through efforts of
the City of Hammond, State of Indiana, City of Chicago, State of Illinois,
and U.S. EPA an order abating pollution at this plant was developed. See
Fed. Reg., Feb. 19, 1974.
187. 514 P.2d 1180 (Nev. 1973).
188. Id. at 1182.
The above quotation points out some of the difficulties with the
nuisance action even to recover damages, and as one commentator
has pointed out: "To abate pollution is more difficult than to re-
cover damages, and monetary damages are in any event inadequate
if the private nuisance action is to prove an effective control on
pollution."18 9 Injunctive relief is necessary is what the commenta-
tor is saying. Yet that large damage awards or even the threat
of such awards as created by class actions provide incentive for
the polluter to take some sort of abatement action.190
A recent nuisance action referred to earlier in this paper, Michie
v. Great Lakes Steel Division,19' illustrates the possibilities of the
suit for damages and shows that the plaintiff, by changing the form
of his action, can at least obtain a hearing. The action was orig-
ally brought as a class action under Rule 23 (b) (3) but when defend-
ants filed a motion to dismiss the class action aspect of the case,
plaintiffs conceded the motion and were allowed to substitute alle-
gations of permissive joinder under Rule 20 (a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. This substitution was a response to Zahn. In
this case the Sixth Circuit, not known as an environmentally-con-
scious circuit,192 held that the federal district court did not abuse
its discretion by refusing to dismiss the diversity suit of 37 Canadian
residents who sought to hold three large corporations liable for the
air pollution caused by their plants on the grounds of nuisance.
The Court of Appeals held that under the law of the State of Michi-
gan multiple defendants, whose independent actions allegedly
create a nuisance, may be jointly and severally liable to multiple
plaintiffs for individual injuries where the pollutants mix in the
air so that their separate effects in creating the individual injuries
are impossible to analyze.
Such imaginative use of the courts has occurred in environmental
189. Note, Water Quality Standards in Private Nuisance Actions, 79 YAmEL.J. 102, 109 (1969). Concerning the awarding of injunctive relief in envi-
ronmental litigation, Russell Peterson, Chairman of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality stated in a letter to the Justice Department about the Re-
serve Mining case, "The appeals court 'should not misread lack of knowl-
edge about a potential hazard as proof that the hazard is slight or does
not exist."' Peterson continued in the letter to show his concern about the
stoppage of the asbestos-like emissions from the taconite plant. "[T ] he tra-
ditional judicial balancing test in cases involving injunctions against health
hazards should be revised to consider the probabilities of occurrence of
harm, the certainty or lack of certainty about the probabilities of harm, the
magnitude of the harm that could occur, and the length of exposure time
during which little evidence of harm would be expected." Current Devel-
opments, 5 Environment Reporter 429 (August 2, 1974).
190. Supra note 32.
191. 6 ERC 1444.
192. Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162.
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litigation and will continue to occur as the field continues to ex-
pand. With air pollution now being considered in land use planning
and a goal of zero discharge for water polluters, the environmental
law area has traveled far from being considered simply an adjunct
to other fields of law.193  This paper has attempted to discuss
merely one aspect of one piece of legislation in the field-the citizen
suit provision of the Clean Air Act. It has attempted to show that
opportunities exist to sue polluters and the administrative agencies
alike to make for a better environment. Robert Fri, former ad-
ministrator of EPA, has pointed out that citizen suits have the po-
tential both of making companies move ahead and making them
take notice in abating pollution. He has also pointed out that citi-
zen suits create uncertainties because of their unexpected inter-
vention in the regulatory process from almost any quarter at almost
any time.194 However, it is because of this same intervention
through citizen groups that the Clean Air Act now encompasses
programs to prevent significant deterioration of air quality, 95 and
include transportation controls, 9 6 indirect source review,39 7 and air
quality maintenance areas.198 Other programs, such as new source
performance standards, emergency episodes, and standards for haz-
ardous pollutants, 9 9 have been toughened through citizen action.
This author, however, feels that it is now time to channel this
citizen action into litigation with the polluter, rather than almost
solely with the administrative agencies. The author was only able
to cite one case brought under section 304 where a privately owned
source of air pollution now polluting had been sued under the Act
-namely, Delaware Ctizens v. Stauffer Chemical.20 0  The author
well recognizes the business risks that citizen suits create, but feels
as a supplement to other forms of action, whether administrative
or judicial, citizen suits are worth employing to aid in preserving
and creating a better environment. The author has also sought to
193. The author notes that in the two years that he worked in Region
V, U.S. EPA, the number of attorneys went from 7 to 21.
194. Fri, Facing up to Pollution Controls, 52 HARv. Bus. REv. 26 (1974).
195. Supra note 115.
196. See generally Bracken, Transportation Controls under the Clean Air
Act: A Legal Analysis, 15 B.C. IND. AND COM. L. R-y. 749 (1974).
197. Supra note 112.
198. NRDC v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
199. Amendments to 40 C.F.R. Part 61, especially dealing with asbestos.
200. 6 ERC 1541 (D. Del. 1973).
illustrate in this paper that options exist to the class action of
Zahn and Eisen. Contrary to the newspaper editorial, the individ-
ual can still command the attention of the court in the environ-
mental field, and the lawyer can still obtain some fruit from the
tree,-the lawsuit. We have seen that the class action in the proce-
dural area of law and environmental law as a substantive area of
law have both made great progress in the past decade and one
should agree with Judge James L. Oakes of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, that such progress will continue,
Indeed, some years hence one may look back upon the sixties and
seventies as an era of the law's developing its own internal self-
sustaining institution, meeting the social demand for law actively
to subserve the public interest in environmental protection--creat-
ing in three steps (1) a public right, (2) persons (or objects) with
standing to assert that right, and (3) provision of the means for
paying the lawyers and technical experts who do the work to assert
the right.2 o1
This article has suggested that citizen suit provisions, if utilized,
include the three steps listed above.
201. Oakes, supra note 85, at 50004.
APPENDIX A
§ 1857h-2. Citizen suits-Establishment of right to bring suit
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf-(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii)
any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent per-
mitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is al-
leged to be in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation un-
der this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State
with respect to such a standard or limitation, or(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of
the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which
is not discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an emission
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to
perform such act or duty, as the case may be.
Notice(b) No action may be commenced-
(1) under subsection (a) (1) of this section-(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of
the violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which
the violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the
standard, limitation, or order, or(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is dili-
gently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States
or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation,
or order, but in any such action in a court of the United States
any person may intervene as a matter of right.(2) under subsection (a) (2) of this section prior to 60 days after
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator,
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except that such action may be brought immediately after such notification
in the case of an action under this section respecting a violation of section
1857c-7 (c) (1) (B) of this title or an order issued by the Administrator pur-
suant to section 1857c-8 (a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall
be given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.
Venue; intervention by Administrator
(c) (1) Any action respecting a violation by a stationary source of an
emission standard or limitation or an order respecting such standard or lim-
itation may be brought only in the judicial district in which such source
is located.
(2) In such action under this section, the Administrator, if not a party,
may intervene as a matter of right.
Award of costs; security
(d) The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant
to subsection (a) of this section, may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the
court determines such award is appropriate. The court may, if a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction is sought, require the filing of
a bond or equivalent security in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Non-restriction of other rights
(e) Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or
class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek en-
forcement of any emission standard or limitation or to seek any other relief
(including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).
Definition
(f) For purposes of this section, the term "emission standard or limita-
tion under this chapter" means-
(l) a schedule or timetable of compliance, emission limitation,
standard of performance or emission standard or
(2) a control or prohibition respecting a motor vehicle fuel or fuel
additive,
which is in effect under this chapter (including a requirement applicable
by reason of section 1857f of this title) or under an applicable implementa-
tion plan.
